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The Dutch energy-distribution network operators have been subject to sector-
specific regulation for about two decades. The objective of the regulation of these 
firms, which have regional monopolies, is to stimulate them to operate more 
efficiently, while the users of their networks should have access to the networks at 
reasonable conditions and the quality of the performance of the networks should 
remain at a high level. 
Although the regulator as well as the operators publish about the performance 
of the network operators annually, a systematic long-term overview of 
this information is lacking. The objective of this policy paper is to provide 
this overview, and by doing so, to contribute to the transparency about the 
effectiveness of the regulation of the energy-distribution network operators.
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1.1 Background and objective 
In many countries, the operators of energy distribution networks are 
subject to sector-specific regulation. The network operators have regional 
monopolies on the distribution of gas and electricity, meaning that they 
are the single company that is active in the distribution without having 
any competitors doing the same in their region. This lack of competition 
could lead to productive inefficiencies in the operation of the networks 
while the companies could also charge above-competitive tariffs. The 
customers, i.e. the network users, would be disadvantaged as a result. 
Therefore, the objective of regulating the energy distribution operators is 
to cap the tariffs they may charge in order to stimulate them to operate as 
efficiently as possible and to prevent that network users pay too much. At 
the same time, the network operators have to realize a high quality of the 
services they provide. This condition requires that the network operators 
have sufficient financial resources to invest in the network when 
necessary.  
In the Netherlands, the energy distribution operators are subject to 
regulatory overview for almost 20 years (Zijl et al., 2008). The precise 
implementation of this regulation has changed in various aspects since 
then. One of these changes is that the organization and the name of the 
regulator have changed. The current organization that is responsible for 
the regulation of Dutch energy markets is the Authority for Consumers & 
Markets (ACM). Despite these organizational changes, the main 
objectives of the network regulation have remained the same. These 
objectives are to foster the network operators to work as efficiently as 
possible, to let network users benefit from these efficiency improvements 
in the form of lower network tariffs and to maintain the quality of the 
network services (see ACM, 2017). 
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1.2 Research questions and method of research 
 
The objective of this policy paper is to contribute to the transparency of 
the effects of regulation of the energy networks. Therefore, the 
development of the Dutch network operators is analyzed by assessing the 
costs for network users, the quality of the network services and the 
financial position of the network operators.  Hence, the questions that will 
be addressed are:  
a) What was the development of the costs per connection of using the 
gas and electricity distribution networks?  
b) What was the development of the quality of the network operators?  
c) What was the development of the financial performance of the 
network operators? 
In order to answer these questions, we use publicly available data 
provided by the ACM and the network operators. Using this data, we first 
compute the average cost of using the gas and electricity network of each 
operator in each year. To control for inflation, these values are deflated. 
Afterwards, we calculate the weighted average costs on a sector level using 
the transported quantities of the network operators as weights. In the 
same manner, the quality of the network services is discussed using data 
on outage time. Finally, the development of the financial performance is 
examined by analyzing the annual reports of the network operators. 
 
1.3 Outline of paper 
The structure of this report is as follows. In Section 2, we first describe the 
institutional setting of the Dutch energy-distribution sector. In Section 3, 
we analyze the costs for network users of using the distribution networks, 
in Section 4, we analyze the quality of the network operators and in 
Section 5, the financial performance of the operators. Lastly, in Section 6 
the answers on the research questions are summarized.  
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This section briefly introduces the energy-distribution operators in the 
Netherlands (Section 2.2) as well as the regulation imposed on these 
companies (Section 2.3). 
 
2.2 Network operators after the ownership unbundling 
The network operators have been established as independent companies 
after the Dutch government imposed ownership unbundling in the energy 
industry in 2007. This ownership unbundling means that the formerly 
vertically integrated energy companies were required to separate their 
network-operation activities from commercial activities in production 
and supply. This governmental intervention in the energy industry had as 
result that a number of new network operators were established. The 
network activities of the energy company Essent moved to the new 
network company Enexis, while the network activities of the energy 
company Nuon moved to the new network operator Liander. Moreover, 
the operation of the network of Delta in the south-west of the Netherlands 
was transferred to the new network company Delta Netwerk Bedrijf 
(DNWB), later renamed in Enduris. More recently, this network company 
was acquired by Stedin, which is the operator of the network formerly 
operated by the vertically integrated energy company Eneco. 
Furthermore, in the north-east of the country, two relatively small 
independent network operators were established: Cogas, later renamed as 
Coteq, and Rendo Netbeheer. Finally, in the western part of the country, 
a network operator with a relatively small area, Westland Infra Netbeheer, 
exists in the region which used to be dominated by the horticulture-
under-glass industry, which industry belongs to the largest users of gas in 
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the Netherlands. As a result, this operator is relatively strongly oriented 
on the distribution of gas, as can be seen in Table 2.1. From this table also 
appears that Enexis and Liander both have a market share of about 1/3, 
while Stedin has a share of about 1/4. 
The total volume of gas distributed by these operators was about 20 
billion m3 in 2017, which was about ½ of the total Dutch gas consumption. 
This indicates that a significant portion of this consumption is done by 
residential users and small companies, like the horticulture under glass. 
The total volume of electricity distributed by these operators was about 87 
TWh in 2017, which was about 3/4 of the total Dutch electricity 
consumption. 
 
Table 2.1. Volumes of transported gas and electricity, per 
network operator, 2017 
  Gas     Electricity     Total   
  Mm3 PJ % GWh PJ % PJ % 
Coteq 502 18 3% 359 1 0% 19 2% 
Enduris 464 16 2% 1909 7 2% 23 2% 
Enexis  6194 218 32% 33544 121 38% 339 34% 
Liander 6228 219 32% 29959 108 34% 327 33% 
Rendo  276 10 1% 310 1 0% 11 1% 
Stedin 4401 155 23% 19984 72 23% 227 23% 
Westland 1178 41 6% 1678 6 2% 47 5% 




Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the regional presence of the companies operating 




































2.3  Regulation of the energy-distribution operators 
The distribution network operators are subject to sector-specific 
regulation. This regulation, which is executed by the Authority for 
Consumers & Markets (ACM), is directed at the maximum tariffs these 
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operators may charge as well as the quality of the services they provide to 
network users. The tariff regulation is meant to protect network users 
from too high tariffs as well as to give the network operators incentives to 
operate as efficiently as possible.  
This regulation is implemented through yardstick regulation, which 
means that the targets for tariffs and quality are based on the average 
performance of all distribution-network operators. As a result, the 
network operators have an incentive to operate more efficiently and 
provide higher quality, as their revenues are related to the extent they 
deviate from the average on group level.1 
The process of setting the tariffs for the individual network operators 
consists of three steps. The first step is the determination of the level of 
the efficient costs per operator, which is based on the outcome of the 
yardstick analysis. The second step is, using the information on the level 
of efficient costs, to determine the level of allowed revenues for each year 
of the regulatory period. This step results in regulatory decisions 
regarding the so-called x-factor. The third and final step is the 
determination of the tariffs per operator. 
In this final step, each network operator submits a proposal of the 
tariffs they want to charge in the following calendar year in the month of 
September of the preceding year. The ACM evaluates this proposal by 
checking whether the resulting revenues do not exceed the allowed level 
of revenues which was determined in the previous step. In order to make 
this analysis, the ACM makes an estimate of the future utilization of the 
network. These estimates result in so-called ‘calculation volumes’ which 
are multiplied with the proposed tariffs in order to obtain an estimate of 
the future revenues. When these expected revenues, using the proposed 
 
1 For more information on the design of this regulation, see ACM (2017).  
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tariffs and the above calculation volumes, are below the allowed level of 
revenues, the regulator approves the maximum tariffs the network 
operator is allowed to charge.  
Regarding the quality of the services provided by the network 
operators, the ACM has implemented a so-called quality regulation, which 
includes, amongst others, financial incentives for the operators to offer 
the optimal quality. These financial incentives are given through a bonus-
malus system in the tariff regulation (for electricity networks) as well as 
rules imposing financial consequences for the operators if the quality of 
these networks is below certain thresholds. 
In this publication, we report on the performance of the network 
operators on these dimensions (tariffs and quality) as well as the financial 
strength of the network operators. In order to so, we only use publicly 
available data, published on the websites of the network operators and the 
ACM. In Appendix F, we give an overview of the data sources. Therefore, 
we do not mention the data sources below each table or figure anymore, 





3. Costs of using the network for network users 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This section analyses how the costs of using the network for users of the 
distribution grids have developed. We first discuss the methodology for 
calculating these costs. Then, we present the results both on the level of 
individual networks as for the group of networks. 
 
3.2 Method and data 
In order to investigate the level of the costs for network users for using the 
distribution networks, we use the annual ACM reports presenting the 
annual tariff decisions from 2012 until 2019. These tariff decisions refer 
to the maximum gas and electricity tariffs for every network operator. To 
take inflation into account, the consumer price index is used to deflate the 
average costs and express all financial values in euros of 2015. Below, we 
first explain the calculations of the average costs of using the gas network, 
subsequently, we do this for the electricity networks. 
In the regulation of the tariffs of using the gas-distribution network, 
the ACM distinguishes three groups of users: residential users, industrial 
users and users with distance metering. In the first two groups, the users 
are connected to the same type of network (i.e. the low-pressure grid) and, 
as a result, they face the same tariffs. In the latter group, however, the 
users can be connected to the low-pressure or the high-pressure grid. In 
order to calculate the average network costs for this group of users, we 
calculate the weighted average costs. In this calculation, the weights are 
based on the share of the so-called calculation volumes in the total 
volume.  
For all groups hold that the costs of using the gas-distribution grid 
depend on two types of tariffs: a fixed tariff per user per year and a fixed 
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tariff per year that depends on the size of the capacity (i.e. a capacity 
tariff). Hence, the average nominal costs of using the gas network are 
calculated as follows: 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 (𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙)
=  𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 + 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  
[3.1] 
To take inflation into account, the average costs of using the network are 
deflated on the basis of the annual changes in the CPI compared to the 
year 2015:2  
 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 (2015 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑠)






As an example, Table 1 shows the regulated tariffs for using the gas-
distribution network of Rendo Gas by users with distance metering in 
2013.  The source of this data is the ACM website, where all annual tariff 
decisions published for Coteq, Enduris, Enexis, Liander, Rendo, Stedin 
and Westland are used.3   
 
2 The CPI values are as follows, 2010:91.6; 2011:93.7; 2012:96.0; 2013:98.4; 
2014:99.4; 2015:100; 2016:100.3; 2017:101.7; 2018:103.4 and 2019:106.2. 
Source: CBS. 
3 These tariff decisions can be found at the ACM’s website 
(https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties) under Publications, subsequently decisions 
and then energy as subject. 
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Table 3.1 Example: regulated tariffs for using the gas-
distribution network for users with distance metering, Rendo 
2013 
Distance metering 
clients (< 16 bar) 
Calculation 
volume (#) 
Tariff  Unit 
Fixed charge per year 
 
Capacity-dependent tariff 
per unit contracted 
capacity per year (low 
pressure) 
 
Capacity- dependent tariff 
per unit contracted 
capacity per year (high 
pressure) 
    91                 
   
 3,855                



































Source: ACM - Annual tariff decision Rendo Gas 2013 
 
For the costs of using the electricity-distribution network, we focus on the 
residential users with a connection to the low-voltage grid which is not 
higher than 3* 25 Ampere, as this is the largest group. Similar to the tariffs 
for the gas-distribution networks, the tariffs here also consist of two 
components: a fixed tariff per connection per year and fixed tariff per year 
which depends on the size of the connection. Hence, the costs of a 
connection to an electricity network are calculated in a similar way as 
above. 
We calculate the average costs of using the electricity and gas 
distribution networks on both the level of individual network operator 
and on the level of the group of operators. For the latter case, we use the 
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amount of transported quantities per network operator as weights (see 
Table 2.1 for the weights in 2017). When in a year data of some operators, 
is missing, we just calculate the weighted average on the basis of the data 




3.3.1 Residential users gas network 
Figure 3.1 shows the average network costs of using the gas network in the 
category of residential users. Panel A presents these results in euros per 
network operator, while Panel B presents the deviation to the sector 
average in percentage. 
From this figure follows that the network costs of users of the Rendo 
network are high in comparison with the other six network operators, 
while the average costs of Westland are the lowest. The average network 
costs of Rendo were 30 percent higher than the sector average in 2015, 
while the tariffs of Westland are continuously about 20% lower than the 
sector average.  
Another observation is that almost all the rates have decreased, only 
Liander’s network costs have increased. Also, the rates of Stedin have 
shown a little increase in 2018.  
  
 
4 In the Appendices, we present the data that are used to make the graphs. 
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Figure 3.1 Average costs for residential users of using the gas 
distribution network, per network operator, 2012 – 2019  
 
Panel A: in euros of 2015 
 
Panel B: in percentage from the sector average 
 
On a sector level, we see that the average costs for residential users have 

























































average annual decline is 1.6% (see Figure 3.2).  This figure demonstrates 
the unweighted and weighted average costs of using the gas network in 
the category residential users. It shows that the unweighted and weighted 
average costs are almost the same. Another conclusion is that till 2016 the 
unweighted and weighted average costs have decreased. From 2016, there 
is a small increase in both the average costs. 
 
Figure 3.2 Unweighted and weighted average costs for 
residential users of using a gas distribution network, 2012-
2018, euros of 2015 
*Note: As data is not available for all operators in each year, the number of 
operators that is taken into account varies between years. 
 
3.3.2 Industrial users gas network 
Figure 3.3 shows the average network costs of using the gas network in 
the category industrial users, both in euros of 2015 and in percentage of 
the sector average. The figure shows, like Figure 3.1, that almost all the 
rates have decreased. There are again two exceptions: Stedin and Liander. 
Coteq has in this category the lowest rates, together with Enduris. The 





















Weighted Average Costs Unweighted Average Costs
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Stedin has the highest costs until 2013, until 2014 Westland. 
Subsequently, until 2015 Rendo had the highest rates, then until 2016 
Westland again. Stedin has the highest network costs since 2017.  
 
Figure 3.3 Average costs for industrial users of using the gas 
distribution network, per network operator, 2012 – 2019 
 
Panel A: in euros of 2015 
 























































On a sector level, we see that the average costs for industrial users of the 
gas-distribution networks have declined with about 20% in the period 
2012-2016 (see Figure 3.4).  Since 2016, the costs have increased slightly. 
In the period 2012-2018, the costs declined on average annually by 3.6%. 
 
Figure 3.4 Unweighted and weighted average costs for 
industrial users of using a gas distribution network, 2012-2018, 
euros of 2015. 
*Note: As data is not available for all operators in each year, the number of 
operators that is taken into account varies between years. 
 
3.3.3 Users gas-distribution network with distance metering 
Figure 3.5 shows the average costs of using the gas network in the category 
distance metering. It appears that Liander en Coteq had the lowest rates, 





















Weighted Average Costs Unweighted Average Costs
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Figure 3.5 Average costs for users with distance metering of 
using the gas distribution network, per network operator, 2012 
– 2019 
 
Panel A: in euros of 2015 
 
 































































Figure 3.6 shows the unweighted and weighted average costs of using the 
gas network in the category distance metering. It appears that on a sector 
level, until 2016 the average costs decreased with about 20%. In the period 
2012-218, the costs declined annually on average by 2.9%.  
 
Figure 3.6 Unweighted and weighted average costs for users 
with distance metering of using the gas distribution network, 
2012-2018 
*Note: As data is not available for all operators in each year, the number of 
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3.3.4 Residential users electricity-distribution network 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the costs of using the electricity-distribution grid for 
residential users.5 It shows that most of the time, Westland has the highest 
network costs in this category. Enexis has the lowest rates, however, from 
2017 Rendo has the lowest prices. For Coteq, Enduris, and Rendo there is 
an increase in costs for residential users from 2012 until 2013. After that, 
there is a decrease for these three network operators. Stedin, Coteq, 
Rendo, and Enexis demonstrate a small increase in 2016, with a decrease 
in costs for 2017.  
On a sector level, the average costs for residential users have 
significantly declined (see Figure 3.8). The average annual decline is 2.3% 





5 The tariffs refer to the group of residential users with a connection which is not 
higher than 3*25 ampere.  
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Figure 3.7 Costs for residential users of using the electricity 
distribution grid, per network operator, 2012-2019 
 
Panel A: in euros of 2015 
 
 


















































Figure 3.8 Unweighted and weighted average costs for 
residential users of using the electricity distribution grid, 2013-
2018 
*Note: As data is not available for all operators in each year, the number of 
operators that is taken into account varies between years 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The results show a clear decline in the average costs in using the gas and 
electricity distribution networks since 2012. This decline may be due to a 
more efficient operation of the network operators. A factor that also likely 
has contributed to the decrease in network costs is the decline in the rate 
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As the functioning of the gas and electricity networks is of key importance 
to their users, the quality of the performance of these networks have to be 
assessed as well. In this chapter, we first briefly explain the methodology 
and data and then we will present the results through a number of figures. 
The chapter will be ended with our conclusions on the quality of network 
performance.  
 
4.2 Methodology and data 
A key measure for the quality of network performance is the outage time. 
Network operators publish the outage time annually in their annual 
reports.6 All the annual reports are found on the website of the network 
operators. In some cases, also the quality and capacity document is used 
since this includes more detailed information about the quality of the 
networks. We have collected the available information  from these reports 
and based on that, we construct figures to present the development per 
operator over time.  
     The weighted average outage time of the networks is calculated by 
using the amount of transported quantities to construct the weights (see 
Table 2.1 for the weights for 2017). The share of each network operator in 
the total amount of quantity transported is used and multiplied with the 
outage time of each network operator. By doing this, the average outage 
time is calculated by the share of the network operators. There is some 
 
6 Unfortunately, not every network operator publishes this information for every 
year.   
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missing data, therefore, the number of network operators that is taken 




4.3.1 Gas-distribution network 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the outage time of the gas networks per operator since 
2005. It shows a fairly low and constant pattern most of the time. There 
are a few exceptions: Enduris in 2012 and 2013, and Liander in 2014 and 
2015. In 2012, a gas pipe of Enduris was damaged during maintenance 
work, leading to an interruption of gas for all the households in 
IJzendijke, Biervliet, Hoofdplaat and Turkeye in the province of Zeeland.   
 
 
Figure 4.1 Outage time of the gas distribution networks, per 

























































































The exceptional value for Enduris in 2013 is due to a malfunction in a 
transfer station, which leads to an interruption of gas distribution for 
approximately 3000 households. The outlier of Liander in 2014 is due to 
a burst water pipe, which damages the gas pipe in Apeldoorn, 580 
households are affected. In 2015, there was a gas interruption in Velsen-
Noord since a gas pipe was damaged during work activities.  Overall, a 
decrease in the outage time is shown by Stedin, Coteq, and Enduris. The 




Figure 4.2 Unweighted and weighted average outage time of the 
gas network, 2006-2018. 
 
*Note: As data is not available for all operators in each year, the number of 
































Weighted Average Outage Time
Unweighted Average Outage Time
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Figure 4.2 shows the weighted and unweighted average outage time in the 
gas-distribution network on a sector level. Until 2011, both the averages 
are almost equal. In 2012 and 2013, the unweighted average is much 
higher than the weighted average, which can be explained by the high 
outage time of Enduris. Enduris is a relatively small network operator, 
implying that its weight on the weighted average outage time is relatively 
small. However, the figure shows the opposite in 2014 and 2015: then the 
weighted average outage time is higher than the unweighted average 
outage time. This time, the higher average outage time is caused by 
Liander, which is a relatively large network operator. Concluding from 
this figure, both the weighted and unweighted average outage time have 
increased in the past years. On average, the annual increase is 14%. 
 
4.3.2 Electricity-distribution networks 
Figure 4.3 shows the outage time of electricity networks of the seven 
different network operators. Overall, the figure shows that the outage time 




Figure 4.3 Outage time of the electricity distribution networks, 
per network operator, 2005-2019 (in minutes per residential 
connection) 
 
When we look at the sector average (both the weighted and unweighted), 
we clearly see a reduction in the outage time (Figure 4.4). The weighted 
average outage has decreased from about 30 minutes per household in 
2006 to about 23 minutes in 2018.  On average, the annual decline was 
2.1%. 
From 2012, the weighted average outage time is higher than the 
unweighted average, which implies that the larger network operators have 
a higher outage time rate, which is also shown in Figure 4.3 as the outage 
times of Liander are relatively high. The outage time of the smaller 



































Figure 4.4 Unweighted and weighted average outage time of the 
electricity distribution networks, 2006 – 2018 (in minutes per 
residential connection) 
 
*Note: there is some data missing, resulting in the case that the amount of network 
operators used to find the weighted average outage time varies.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Concluding, the quality of the performance of the electricity grids have 
significantly improved since 2006, while the quality of the gas grids has 
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In order to be able to continue their business and to maintain the quality 
of network performance, network operators need to have sufficient 
financial strength. In this chapter, we describe the financial revenues per 
unit of transported energy, the investments in the networks and the 
financial position measured through a number of financial ratios.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We first describe the 
methodology before presenting the results We conclude by formulating  
our conclusions regarding the financial performance.  
 
5.2 Methodology and data 
In order to calculate the realized average tariff per PJ transported energy 
per network operator, the revenues of each operator are divided by the 
transported volumes in PJ of gas and electricity together. This metric 
measures the average revenue per unit of transported energy. 
The investments refer, as far as possible, to the investments in fixed 
assets of the network. As financial ratios we use the following:  
● EBIT / interest coverage, which measures to what extent the 
earnings (i.e. the Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) enable the firm 
to pay the interests on debt. 
● FFO /  interest coverage, which measures to what extent the cash 
flow from operational activities (i.e. the Funds From Operations) are 
sufficient to pay the interests on debt. 
● FFO / debt, which measures to what extent the cash flow from 
operational activities (i.e. the Funds From Operations) are sufficient 
to repay the debt. 
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● debt / capitalization, which measures to what extent the firm is 
financed with debt. 
We report the information on these financial variables for each 
operator, both in absolute values as in percentage deviation from the 
mean per network operator. In addition, we calculate these values on a 
sector level, both as weighted and unweighted average. 
To control for inflation, the revenues are deflated by using the annual 
changes in the CPI with 2015 as base year. 
The data on these financial aspects are found in the annual reports of 
the network operators.  
       
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Revenues per unit of transported energy  
 
Figure 5.1 shows the deflated revenues in euros per transported energy in 
PJ per network operator. From this figure appears that Liander has the 
highest revenue per transported unit of energy. Panel B demonstrates the 
deviation from the mean. This figure shows that besides Westland, also 
the revenue per transported unit of energy from Enduris and Coteq is 





Figure 5.1 Revenues per unit of transported energy, per 
network operator, 2010-2019  
 
Panel A: in euros of 2015 per GJ 
 
































































On a sector level, we see that the average revenue (in euros of 2015) per 
unit of energy has increased since 2010 (see Figure 5.2). As the tariffs for 
network users (based on connections and capacity) have declined, which 
we have seen in Chapter 3, while the transported volumes of gas and 
electricity was fairly constant in this period (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4), 
implying that the network operators have realized more connections with 
network users. 
 
Figure 5.2 Revenues per unit of transported energy by 
distribution operators, 2010-2019 (euros of 2015) 
 
*Note: for some years, there is some data missing, resulting in the fact that the 

































Unweighted Average Weighted Average
36 
 
Figure 5.3 Transported volumes of gas per operator, 2006-
2019 (in million m3), 2006-2018  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Transported volumes of electricity per operator, 





























































5.3.2 Investments in distribution networks  
 
In line with the extension of the number of connections, we also see a 
growth in the annual network investments by a number of operators (see 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6) 
 































Figure 5.6 Investments in million euros by the group of 
distribution-network operators, 2009-2019 
 
Note: there is some data missing, resulting in the case that the amount of network 
operators used to find the weighted average outage time varies.  
 
5.3.3 Financial ratios of network operators  
 
The financial strength of the network operators is measured through a 
number of financial ratios. Figure 5.7 shows the ratio EBIT/Interest 
coverage. This ratio measures to what extent a firm is able to pay the 
interests on debt. It appears that Rendo and Westland have the highest 
ratio. In addition, Liander has the lowest values of this ratio.  
Figure 5.8 shows that on  a sector level, this ratio has improved slightly 
in the most recent years.  The network operators with the highest ratios 
are Rendo and Westland, which are relatively small network operators. 





























Figure 5.7 EBIT / Interest coverage, per network operator, 
2010-2019 
 
Figure 5.8 EBIT / Interest coverage, average of network 
operators, 2010-2019 























































Figure 5.9 shows the ratio FFO/interest coverage. This ratio measures to 
what extent a firm is able to pay the interests on debt from the operational 
results.  From this figure, it appears that Enduris has the highest rate until 
2015. Afterwards, Coteq and Westland have higher rates. Again, Liander 
has the lowest rates.   
Figure 5.10 shows that on average in the sector, the coverage of the 
interests had increased strongly.  Until 2012, the weighted and 
unweighted averages were almost equal. From then, the unweighted 
average is again higher than the weighted average, which can be explained 
by the lower rates of Liander, which is a relatively large network operator, 
and the higher values of Coteq and Westland, which are relatively small 
operators.  
 
Figure 5.9 FFO / Interest coverage, per network operator, 2010-
2019 
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Figure 5.11 shows the ratio FFO/debt. This ratio measures the ability of a 
firm to repay the debt. The higher this ratio, the stronger this ability. From 
the figure, it appears that Westland has the highest values of this ratio. 
Liander and Stedin have relatively low values. 
Figure 5.12 shows the unweighted and weighted average of this ratio. 
Both the averages are almost equal. Only during 2012, 2016 and 2017 the 
unweighted average is higher. The difference in 2012 can be explained by 
a higher peak of Westland in 2012. Also, in 2016 and 2017 the rates of 
Westland show a peak. Since Westland is a relatively small network 
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Figure 5.11 FFO / Debt (%), per network operator, 2010-2019 
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Figure 5.13 shows the ratio debt/capitalization. This ratio measures to 
what extent a firm is financed with debt.  The lower this ratio, the stronger 
the financial position. The figure shows that the values of Liander are 
relatively high, while the values of Enexis are relatively low. Therefore, 
Enexis scores the best on this ratio.  
Figure 5.14 shows the unweighted and weighted averages of this ratio, 
which are almost equal. In 2012, the weighted average is only slightly 
higher than the unweighted average, which is due to a peak of Liander, a 
relatively large network operator. Over the full period, the figure shows 
that on average the share of debt in financing has slightly declined.  
 
Figure 5.13 Debt / Capitalization, per network operator, 2010-
2019 
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Figure 5.14 Debt / Capitalization, on average per network 
operator, 2010-2019 
*Note: there is some data missing, resulting in the case that the amount of network 
operators used to find the weighted average outage time varies. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The general picture coming forward from the graphs on the financial 
position is that network operators have realized higher revenues per unit 
of energy that is transported, that they have invested more in the 
networks, that their ability to pay the interests on debt has improved, 
while the share of debt in the total financing has slightly decreased. 
Among the group of network operators, however, there are quite strong 
differences. For instance, Liander, a relatively large network operator, 
scores less on the financial ratios than the smaller network operators 


































The operators of the networks for distributing gas and electricity play an 
important role in the economy and, therefore, it is important to know how 
well these operators function. As these operators are natural monopolies, 
they are subject to sector-specific regulation, which is executed by the 
Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM) in the Netherlands. By 
describing the realized performance of these network operators, this 
policy paper hopes to contribute to the transparency about the 
effectiveness of this regulation. 
Using publicly available information on the websites of the network 
operators and the ACM, this report has described the performance of 
these operators. For all Dutch energy distribution-network operators 
(Coteq, Enduris, Enexis, Liander, Rendo, Stedin and Westland), we 
describe the annual performance with regard to the costs of using the 
network for network users, the quality of the network operation and the 
financial strength.  We conclude the following. 
● The costs of using the electricity and gas networks have significantly 
declined. This holds for the various types of users. The costs for users 
declined annually on average by about 2%.  
● The quality of the performance of the electricity network, measured 
in average outage time per connection, has strongly improved, while 
the quality of the gas networks, measured as average outage time per 
connection, has deteriorated.  
● The average financial position of the network operators has 
improved, measured in terms of revenues per unit of transported 
energy, the ability to pay interest on debt and the share of debt in the 
total financing. It seems that in general the smaller network 
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Appendix A. Annual costs per type of network user of using the 
gas distribution grid per network operator, 2012-2019, in euros 
of 2015  
 
Table A.1 Residential users 
Operator 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq 116 124 110 95 96 97 95 94 
Enduris 115 117 108 96 92 96 95 92 
Enexis 113 116 107 99 94 95 94 92 
Liander 112 118 108 98 91 105 110 105 
Rendo 131 142 139 130 116 113 111 109 
Stedin 108 113 105 97 86 94 100 97 
Westland 90 96 91 82 79 79 78 76 
 
 
Table A.2 Industrial users 
Operator 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq 1985 2145 1830 1508 1548 1572 1537 1525 
Enduris 2111 2165 1957 1696 1627 1694 1679 1632 
Enexis 2220 2314 2059 1881 1754 1743 1719 1683 
Liander 2191 2325 2069 1829 1671 1962 2067 1971 
Rendo 2211 2424 2416 2246 1954 1944 1909 1879 
Stedin 2644 2809 2327 2132 1831 1996 2155 2081 





Table A.3  Users with distance metering 
Operator 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq 7672 8300 6126 5433 5615 5757 5635 5594 
Enduris 7417 7647 8109 6999 6707 7438 7313 7167 
Enexis 8529 9641 8827 8181 7648 7589 7464 7304 
Liander 5866 6202 5575 5070 4951 5826 6084 5848 
Rendo 10678 10417 10362 9646 8477 7703 7497 7374 
Stedin 10229 10803 9514 8493 7209 7776 7984 7798 






Appendix B. Annual costs per residential user of using the 
electricity distribution grid, per network operator, 2012-2019, 
in euros of 2015 
 
Operator 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq 188 200 153 141 154 143 134 138 
Enduris 171 181 166 159 156 149 168 171 
Enexis - 158 146 142 142 133 134 134 
Liander - 164 156 155 154 158 160 151 
Rendo 166 183 146 141 147 134 132 130 
Stedin - 168 154 144 150 139 144 145 
Westland 212 189 188 194 196 168 165 161 
 







Appendix C Outage time gas distribution networks, per 
network operator, in seconds per connection, 2005-2019 
 
Tabel C.1 period 2005-2012 
Operator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coteq - - - - - - - - 
Enduris - - - - - 35 38 393 
Enexis - 24 54 42 24 43 69 36 
Liander 32 19 20 21 27 23 35 56 
Rendo - - - - - - - - 
Stedin - - - 17 21 31 28 77 
Westland - - - - - - - - 
 
 Tabel C.2 period 2013-2019 
Operator 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq 18 54 19 16 13 12 - 
Enduris 811 21 17 17 22 - - 
Enexis 50 90 78 45 50 90 51 
Liander 38 419 241 85 94 39 40 
Rendo - 18 1 14 31,7 27 - 
Stedin 42 124 97 52 42 69 - 






Appendix D Outage time of electricity distribution networks, 
per network operator, in minutes per connection, 2005-2019 
 
Tabel D.1 period 2005-2012 
 
Operator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coteq - - - - - - - - 
Enduris - - - - - 26 15 19 
Enexis - 25 24 22 20 25 19 22 
Liander 24 30 48 24 27 31 20 25 
Rendo - - - - - - - - 
Stedin - 36 23 20 28 28 25 36 
Westland  - - - - - - - - 
 
Tabel D.2 period 2013-2019 
 
Operator 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq 7 3 4 1 5 5 - 
Enduris 18 17 16 15 17 - - 
Enexis 24 18 14 15 14 16 14 
Liander 24 20 22 23 21 31 22 
Rendo - 6 13 12 2 14 - 
Stedin 21 21 24 17 16 17 - 






Appendix E. Financial data 
 
 
Table E.1 Revenues per unit of transported energy, per network 
operator, 2010-2019 (euros of 2015 per PJ) 
 
Operator 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Coteq - - - - - 
Enduris 1,93 2,26 2,03 1,83 2,21 
Enexis 3,32 4,00 3,93 3,82 4,44 
Liander - - 4,78 5,22 6,20 
Rendo - - - - - 
Stedin - 3,57 4,04 4,13 4,63 
Westland  1,28 1,41 1,49 1,53 1,89 
 
Operator 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq 2,59 2,53 2,77 2,81 - 
Enduris 1,76 1,67 1,85 - - 
Enexis 4,07 3,91 3,76 3,91 4,05 
Liander 5,38 4,38 4,99 5,24 - 
Rendo - 3,11 3,17 3,2 - 
Stedin 4,38 4,21 4,22 - - 






Table E.2 Investments in gas and electricity network, per 
network 0perator, 2009-2019 (in million euros of 2015) 
 
Operator 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Coteq - - - - - - 10 13 12 12 
Enduris - - - - - - - - - - 
Enexis 320 346 363 382 357 357 338 384 423 560 
Liander - - - - - - - - - - 
Rendo - - - - - - - - - - 
Stedin - - - - - - 360 402 494 607 
Westland - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Table E.3 EBIT / Interest coverage, per network operator, 2010-
2018 
 
Operator 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Coteq - - - - - 3,2 6,2 9,36 12,1 
Enduris - - 5,5 7,5 8,7 5,8 6,2 4,6 - 
Enexis - - - 3,7 0 - - - - 
Liander - - 4,7 4,2 4,7 3,4 2,3 3,6 4,5 
Rendo - - - - - - 9,1 10,7 10,9 
Stedin - - - - - - - - - 






Table E.4 FFO / Interest coverage, per network operator 
 
Operator 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq - - - - - 7,15 11,35 14,37 19,06 - 
Enduris - - 8,9 11,4 11,4 11,4 11,8 8,6 - - 
Enexis - - - 5,8 8 8,3 8,1 9,9 10,9 11,5 
Liander - - 7 5,6 5,9 4,5 3,9 5,6 6,5 - 
Rendo - - - - - - 10,7 12,4 12,9 14,6 
Westland 5,6 6 6,5 7,3 7,5 9 14,2 12,7 15,1 - 
 
 




2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq - - - - - 18 18 18 18 - 
Enduris - - 19 27 25 25 20 17 - - 
Enexis - - - 33 34 30 26 25 27 23 
Liander - - 16 16 16 13 10 15 15 - 
Rendo - - - - - - 27 26 26 25 

















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Coteq - - - - - 41 39 45 43 - 
Enduris - - 53 47 45 43 44 43 - - 
Enexis - - - 33 32 33 36 37 36 39 
Liander - - 65 66 66 66 68 59 61 - 
Rendo - - - - - 45 54 54 57 57 






Appendix F Information sources 
 
 
For the analysis of the performance of the energy-distribution operators, 
we have used the following sources from the websites of the respective 
organisations: 
 
1) Annual Reports of network operators: 
 
Coteq:   Annual Reports 2016-2018 
Enduris:   Annual Reports 2012-2018 
Enexis:    Annual Reports 2009-2019 
Liander:   Annual Reports 2009-2018 
Stedin:   Annual Reports 2009-2018 
Rendo:    Annual Reports 2014-2018 
Westland:   Annual Reports 2017-2018 
 
 
2) Quality and Capacity Documents of a number of Network Operators.  
 
3) Tariff decisions regarding the gas and electricity distribution operators, 
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The Dutch energy-distribution network operators have been subject to sector-
specific regulation for about two decades. The objective of the regulation of these 
firms, which have regional monopolies, is to stimulate them to operate more 
efficiently, while the users of their networks should have access to the networks at 
reasonable conditions and the quality of the performance of the networks should 
remain at a high level. 
Although the regulator as well as the operators publish about the performance 
of the network operators annually, a systematic long-term overview of 
this information is lacking. The objective of this policy paper is to provide 
this overview, and by doing so, to contribute to the transparency about the 
effectiveness of the regulation of the energy-distribution network operators.
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